Fast group operations on elliptic curves in Maple  by Yan, S.Y. & James, G.
PERGAMON Computers and Mathematics with Applications 37 (1999) 129-138 
An I ~  Journlll 
computers & 
mathematics 
with sppilcetkms 
Fast Group Operations on 
Elliptic Curves in Maple* 
S. V. VAN t AND G. JAMES 
School of Mathematical nd Information Sciences 
Coventry University, Coventry CV1 5FB, U.K. 
s.  yah@coventry, ac.  uk 
(Received March 1998; accepted April 1998) 
Abst rac t - - In  this paper, a fast and systematic method for group operations on elliptic curves 
is developed, and its implementation i  Maple discussed. Some applications of the fast method 
in computer security, as well as some future work on parallel group operations are also discussed. 
(~) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords - -E l l ip t i c  curves, Fast group operations, Maple, Applications of elliptic curves, Parallel 
group operations. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Elliptic curves have been studied by number theorists for about a century; not for applications 
to mathematics or computer science, but because of their intrinsic mathematical beauty and 
interest. In recent years, however, elliptic curves have found applications in many areas of 
mathematics and computer science. For example, by using the theory of elliptic curves, Lenstra 
invented the powerful factoring method ECM [1], Atkin and Morain designed the practical elliptic 
curve primality proving algorithm ECPP [2], Koblitz proposed the idea of elliptic public-key 
cryptosystems [3], and Wiles proved the famous Fermat Last Theorem [4]. In this paper, a fast 
and systematic method for group operations on elliptic curves is developed and its implementation 
in Maple discussed. First some basic concepts of elliptic curves from both a geometric and an 
algebraic, particularly a group-theoretic, point of view will be reviewed and an efficient algorithm 
for group operations on elliptic curves will be introduced, together with its implementation in 
Maple. Applications to integer factorization and cryptography are then considered. Finally, some 
future work on parallel computation is mentioned, including a massively distributed approach to 
the difficult elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 
2. FUNDAMENTALS 
Since the computations on elliptic curves discussed in the paper are based on the theory of 
groups, rings, and fields, some basic concepts associated with these three algebraic structures are 
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first reviewed. For more information about the algebraic structures, as well as elliptic curves, 
readers are advised to consult, e.g., Ellis [5-7]. 
DEFINITION 1. A group (G, *) is a set G, closed under a binary operat ion. ,  such that the 
following axioms are satisfied. 
(i) Associativity: (a • b) * c = a * (b * c), V a, b, c E G. 
(ii) Existence of identity: there exists an element e of G, called the identity of G, such that 
e .a=a.e - -a ,  Va E G. 
(iii) Existence of inverse: there exists an element a-  1 called the inverse of G such that a ,a -  1 = 
a -1 *a = e, Va E G. 
A group (G, *) is said to be commutative or Abelian, f l i t  satisfies a further axiom. 
(iv) Commutativity: a • b = b * a, V a, b E G. 
In an Abelian group, the binary operation * is often denoted by ~,  the identity by O, the 
inverse of a -1 by Ga, and the power a k by ka. 
A group (G, *) is said to be finite if  [G[ < oo; otherwise it is infinite. 
EXAMPLE 1. (Z +, +) is not a group, since there is no identity element for + in Z +, whereas (Z, +) 
is a group, the identity element for + is O, and the inverse of n is -n .  In fact, it is an infinity 
group. (Z/nZ, +) is a finite Abelian group, whereas ((Z/nZ)*, .) is a finite (multiplicative) group, 
where (Z/nZ)* is the set of elements in Z/nZ that are relatively prime to n. 
DEFINITION 2. A ring (R, ~, ®) is a set R, satisfying the following axioms: 
(i) (R, ~) is an Abelian group, 
(ii) (D is associative, 
(iii) V a, b, c E R, the left (right) distributive law holds: 
ae (bE)c) = (a®b) E)(a®c), 
(a (B b) (D c =: (a C) c) E) (a C) c). 
DEFINITION 3. A field is a commutative ring in which every nonzero element has an inverse. A 
field is called a finite field, denoted by Fq, with q = pa a prime power, ff  it has a finite number q 
of elements in it. (Since up to isomorphism, there is only one finite field of q elements, this 
field is often denoted by GF(q). The letters G and F stand for Galois Field, after the French 
mathematician Evariste Gnlois.) 
REMARK 1. Any ring is an Abelian group under addition (e.g., the ring Z/nZ is additive group); 
and all the nonzero elements of a field, e.g., (Z/pZ)* (or all the invertible elements of a ring 
(Z/nZ)*) form a multiplicative group. Since (Z/nZ)* = Z /nZ - {0) - {a : gcd(a, n) ~ 1), 
(Z/nZ)* = Z/nZ - {0) if and only if n is prime. 
EXAMPLE 2. Z /nZ with n composite is a ring but not a field since, e.g., the modular inverse for 
1/3 rood 12 does not exist, whereas Z/pZ with p prime is a field, since, e.g., 1/3 mod 11 = 4. 
DEFINITION 4. I f  for a ring R, a positive integer n exists such that na = 0 for all a E R, then 
the least such positive integer n is the characteristic of the ring R. I f  no such positive integer 
exists, then R is of characteristic O. 
EXAMPLE 3. The ring Z/nZ is of characteristic n, while Z, Q, R, and C all have characteristic 0. 
A finite field has prime characteristic, e.g., Fp has characteristic p. 
REMARK 2. The notations Z, and Zp rather than Z/nZ and Z/pZ are also often used. 
DEFINITION 5. Let K be a field of characteristic different from 2 or 3, and let 
x ~ + ax + b, a, b E K (1) 
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be a cubic polynomial over K with no repeated roots, that is, 4a 3 + 27b 2 ¢ 0. An elliptic curve 
over K, denoted by E(K)  or simply E, is the set of points (x, y) with x, y E K satisfying the 
equation 
y2 = x 3 + ax + b, (2) 
together with a single point denoted O and called the point at infinity. (For fields o[ characteristic 
2 or 3, the general form of the equation on an elliptic curve are y2 -b y = x 3 + ax + b and 
y2 = x 3 q_ ax 2 -b bx -b c, respectively.) 
DEFINITION 6. GEOMETRIC COMPOSITION LAW. Let P, Q E E, L the line connecting P and Q 
(tangent line to E if P = Q), and R the third point of intersection of L with E. Let L I be the 
line connecting R and O. Then P ~ Q is the point such that L ~ intersects E at R, 0 and P ~ Q 
(see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. An elliptic curve over field K. 
The composition law defined previously has the following group- 
(i) / f  a line L intersects E at the (not necessary distinct) points P, Q, R, then 
(P~Q)  @R = O. 
(ii) P~O=P,  VPEE.  
(iii) P@Q=Q@P,  VP, QEE.  
(iv) Let P E E, then there is a point of E, denoted @P, such that 
P • (eP)  = O. 
(v) Let P, Q, R E E, then 
(P~Q)~R= P~(Q~R) .  
In other words, the composition law makes E into an Abelian group with identity element O. 
PROPOSITION 2. ALGEBRAIC COMPUTATION LAW. Let Px = (x l ,y l ) ,  P2 = (x2,Y2) be points 
on E : y2 = x 3 + ax + b, then/)3 = (x3, Y3) = P1 • P2 on E may be computed by 
(x3, y3) = (~ - x l  - x~, ~ (~1 - z3)  - y l ) ,  (3) 
where [ (~x~ +a)  i f  P1 = P~, 2yl ' (4) 
A = (Y2 - Yl) otherwise. (x~ - ~)' 
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3.  FAST  COMPUTATIONS 
In this section, fast group operations on elliptic curves over some fields are discussed. 
3.1. Bas ic  Idea  for Fast  Computat ion  of  kP  on  E 
The most fundamental computation on elliptic curves are the group operations of the type 
kP  =,P  ~ P ~ . . . ~ P ,  (5) 
k ti'mes 
where P = (x, y) is a point on an elliptic curve E : 92 = x 3 + ax + b, and k a very large positive 
integer. Since the computation of kP  is so fundamental in all elliptic curve related computations 
and applications, it is desirable that such computations are carried out as fast as possible. The 
basic idea of the fast computation of kP  is as follows. 
(i) Compute 2~P, for i = 0, 1 ,2, . . .  ,~ - 1, with ~ = L1.442 Ink + lJ. 
(ii) Add together suitable multiples of P, determined by the binary expansion of k. 
For example, to compute kP  where k = 232792560, we first compute 
P, 2P, 22p, 23p, 24p, ..., 225p, 226p, 
N II II II II 
2(2P), 2(22p), 2(23P) . . . . .  2(224p), 2(225p), 
since ~ = [1.442 In k + l j  = 28. Then, by the binary expansion of k, 
k = 23279256010 = 11011110000000100001111100002, 
we add only those multiples that correspond to 1: 
227p 
II 
2(226p) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
227 226 224 223 222 221 213 . 28 27 26 25 24 
and ignore those multiples that correspond to 0: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
225 220 219 218 217 216 215 214 212 211 21o 29 23 22 21 20 
Thus, we finally have 
kP  = 227p (B 226p (B 224p (B 223p (B 222p ~ 221p (B 213p (~ 2SP (B 2ZP @ 26P @ 2SP (B 24p. 
3.2. A lgor i thm for Fast  Computat ion  of  kP  on E 
A fast sequential algorithm for computing kP  on E is now considered. The idea of the algorithm 
is as follows. Suppose kl0 = (e#e~_l . . .  el)2, then for i starting from ~ - 1 to 1, check whether 
or not ei = 1 (note that e~ is either 1 or 0). If ei -- 1, perform a doubling and an addition group 
operation; otherwise, just perform a doubling operation. For example, to compute 89P, since 
89 = 1011001, we have 
e? 1 P initialization 
e6 0 2P doubling 
e5 1 2(2P) + P doubling and addition 
e3 1 2(2(2P) + P) -t- P doubling and addition 
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e3 0 2(2(2(2P) + P)  + P) 
e2 0 2(2(2(2(2P) + P)  + P)) 
el 1 2(2(2(2(2(2P) -I- P) + P))) -t- P 
II 
89P 
doubling 
doubling 
doubling and addition 
The following algorithm implements this idea. 
ALGORITHM 1. (Fast algorithm for computing kP  modulo N on E.) 
[1] Precomputation: Write k in its binary expansion form kl0 = (e~e~_l ... el)2 (~ = ll.442 ln(k) 
+ 11). 
[2] Initialization: Initialize the values for a, xl and Yl. Let (xc, Yc) = (x l ,  Yl); this is exactly the 
computation task for ez (e~ always equals 1). 
[3] Doublings and Additions: Compute kP  mod N. 
for i from ~-- 1 downto 1 do 
ml ~- 3x 2 + a (mod N) 
m2 ~-- 2yc (mod N) 
M ~-- ml /m2 (mod N) 
x3 *-- M 2 - 2Xc (mod N) 
Y3 ~ M(xc  - z3) - Yc (mod N) 
X c ~-- X 3 
Yc ~--- Y3 
if e~ = 1 
then e ~-- 2c+ P 
ml ~ Yc - Yl (mod N) 
m2 *-- xc - Xl (mod N) 
M ~-- ml /m2 (mod N) 
x3 ~-- M 2 - x l  - Xc (rood N) 
Y3 ~ M(x l  - x3) - Yl (mod N) 
Xc ~'- X3 
Yc +'-- Y3 
else c ~ 2c 
[4] Print c (now c = kP  (mod N)) and terminate the algorithm. 
THEOREM 1. The computat ion  o f  kP  (where P E E )  over Z /pZ  can be per fo rmed in O(log k) 
group operat ions and in O(log k(logp) 3) bit operations. 
For a justification of this theorem, see [8, p. 178]. 
3.3. Map le  Imp lementat ion  o f  the  Fast  Computat ion  
A Maple implementation of the algorithm for computing kP  over Z/NT. is as follows. (It is 
suggested that those whose who are not familiar with Maple should consult [9].) 
### Fast Computation of kP on Ell iptic Curves ### 
with(numtheory) : 
## Step 1 -- Curve Selection 
# y^2 = x^3 + ax + b 
#b=8-a  
# a =1,2 , . . .  
# so fo r  a =1;  we have y^2=x^3 + x + 7 
# P ---- (1 ,3 )  
# k = 420 # Let k =icm(1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 
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a := I; 
x_l := I; 
y_l := 3; 
k := 99; 
size:= floor(l.442695041 * in (k) + 1); 
s :ffi convert(k, base, 2); 
e := array(l..size, s) ; 
###### Step 2 -- Initialization 
c := P; 
z_c  := z_l; 
y_c := y_l; 
###### Step  3 --  Computat ion  
for i from size - i  by -1 to 1 do 
m_l := 3*x_c 2 + a mod N: 
m_2 • 
M := 
x_3 := 
y-3 := 
X_C : = 
y_c  : = 
if e[i] = 
then  
else 
fi: 
od: 
done:  
2*y_c mod N: 
m_l / m_2 mod N: 
M^2 - 2*x_c mod N: 
M * (x_c - x_3) - y_c mod N: ## doubling 2c 
x_3: 
y_3: 
1 ## c :=2*c+P;  
c := 2*c+P: ## counter 
m_l := y_c - y_l mod N: ## Compute 2* c + P 
nu2 := x_c - x_i mod N: 
M := m_1 / m_2 mod N: 
x_3 := W2 - x_1 - x_c mod N: 
y_3 := M * (x_l - x_3) - y_l rood N: 
X_C := X_3: 
y_c := y_3: 
## addition 2c+P 
c := 2.c: ### e[i] = 0, compute c := 2.c 
4. SOME APPL ICAT IONS 
As indicated in the introduction section of this paper, elliptic curves have found applications 
in many areas of mathematics and computer science. In this section, two applications of the fast 
elliptic curve computation method are discussed: integer factorization and public-key cryptogra- 
phy. 
4.1. Elliptic Curve Factoring 
The elliptic curve method (ECM)  for factoring an integer N involves elliptic curves over Q. 
Observe that in the third step of Algorithm 1, since N is composite, if m l /m2 - O (mod N), 
then m2 and N are not relatively prime and d = gcd(m2, N)  will be a nontrivial divisor of N, 
unless d = N, which is a very unlikely event. The following algorithm is based on that in 
[11, p. 290]. 
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ALGORITHM 2. Given a composite integer N > 1 with gcd(N, 6) = 1, then the following algo- 
rithm attempts to find a nontrivial factor of N. 
[1] (Choose an Elliptic Curve.) Choose a random pair (E, P), where E is an elliptic curve 
y2 = x3 + ax  + b over Z/NZ,  and P(x ,  y) E E (Z /NZ)  is a point on E. That  is, choose 
a, x ,  y E Z /NZ at random, and set b +-- y2 _ x 3 _ ax.  If gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2, N) ~ 1, then E 
is not an elliptic curve, start all over to choose another pair (E, P). 
[2] (Choose an Integer k.) Select a positive integer k that is divisible by many prime powers; 
for example, set k = lcm(1, 2 , . . . ,  B) or k = B! for a suitable bound B; the larger B is 
the more likely the method will succeed in producing a factor, but the longer the method 
will take to work. 
[3] (Calculate kP . )  Calculate the point kP  E E (Z /NZ)  using Algorithm 1 in Section 3. 
[4] (Compute GCD.) If kP  - 0 (mod N), then compute d = gcd(m2, N),  else goto [1] to 
start a new choice for "a" or even for a new pair (E, P). 
[5] (Factor Found?) If 1 < d < N, then d is a nontrivial factor of N, output d and goto [7]. 
[6] (Start Over?) If d is not a nontrivial factor of N and if one still wishes to try more elliptic 
curves, then goto [1] to start all over again, else goto [7]. 
[7] (Exit.) Terminate the algorithm. 
EXAMPLE. To factor N -- 7560636089 by an elliptic curve method, select an elliptic curve E : 
y2 = x 3 .{_ ax  + b with b = y2 _ x 3 _ ax  = 8 - a, for the initial point P = (x, y) = (1, 3) 
on E. Set k = lcm(1, 2, 3 , . . . ,  19) -- 232792560. Then compute 232792560P mod 7560636089 for 
a = 1,2, . . .  ,50, say. The modular inverse for each case in the computation exists, so it fails to 
produce a factor of N on this occasion. Thus, increase to k = lcm(2, 3 , . . . ,  25) -- 26771144400 
and compute 26771144400P mod 7560636089 for a -- 1, 2 , . . . .  This t ime for a = 1, when the 
computation carries on to 1673196525P, we have 
5398907681 
1016070716 
mod 7560636089, 
but this division is impossible, since the modular inverse for 
1016070716 
mod 7560636089 
does not exist, the computation stops. Then compute d = gcd(1016070716, 7560636089) -- 15121, 
to obtain a nontrivial divisor of N. In fact, 7560636089 -- 15121.500009. Note that a = 2 , . . . ,  25 
will fail, but a = 26 will succeed again to produce a factor of N. It  is worthwhile pointing out 
that in [6, p. 338], it is wrongly reported that the case a = 1 fails to produce a factor of N. The 
following is a Maple program specifically for calculating this case. 
## Step 1 -- Curve Select ion,  select some parameters  for E 
a := i; 
x_l := 1; 
y_l := 3; 
N := 7560636089; 
k := 26771144400;  # k=lcm(2 ,3 ,  . . . ,25)  
s i ze  := f loor (1 .442695041 * in  (k  * 1 .0 )  + 1) ;  
s := convert(k,  base, 2); 
e := array(1 ... size, s); 
###### Step 2 -- In i t ia l i zat ion 
c := P; 
X_C := x_l; 
y_c := y_l; 
###### Step 3 - -  Computat ion  
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for i f rom size - i by -I to 1 do 
m_l := 3.x_c^2 + a mod N: 
m_2 :ffi 2*y_c mod N: 
M :ffi m_1 / m_2 mod N: 
x_3 :ffi M~2 - 2*x_c mod N: 
y_3 :ffi M * (x_c - x_3) - y_c mod N: ## doubl ing 2c 
x_c := x_3: 
y_c := y_3: 
if e[i] ffi 1 ## c :ffi 2.c + P; 
then c := 2*c+P: ## counter 
m_l := y_c - y_l mod N: ## Then Compute 2.c + P 
m_2 := x_c - x_l mod N: 
M := m_l / m_2 mod N: 
x_3 := M^2 - x_l - x_c mod N: 
y_3 := M * (x_l - x_3) - y_l mod N: 
y_c := y_3: 
else 
## addi t ion 2c+P x_c :ffi x_3: 
c := 2.c: ### e[l,i] ffi 0, compute c := 2.c 
fi: 
od: 
###### Step 4 -- Computing GCD 
pr int( 'c  •', c); 
pr int ( 'm_ l  = ' , re_l) ; 
print( 'm_2 = ' , m_2) ; 
pr int(gcd(N,  m_2)) ; 
4.2. El l ipt ic Curve  Cryptography  
There are essentially two types of computational problems on elliptic curves. 
(i) Compute Q = kP, where P is a point on E. 
(ii) Compute k = logp Q, where both P and Q are points on E. 
The first is the group operations on elliptic curves, whereas the second is the discrete logarithm 
analog on elliptic curves. The security of all elliptic curve cryptographic systems is based on 
the assumption that "it should be easy to compute Q = kP, but it would be very difficult to 
compute k = logp Q"; an idea arrived at independently by Koblitz and Miller [3] in the mid- 
eighties. Here, only the elliptic curve analog of EIGamal's cryptographic scheme [11], on which 
the U.S. government's Digital Signature Scheme (DSS) is based, is discussed. 
(i) Alice and Bob publicly choose an elliptic curve E over Fp with p prime, and a random 
base point P 6 E. 
(ii) Alice chooses a random integer a and computes raP; Bob also chooses a random integer b 
and computes rbP. 
(iii) To send a message-point M to Bob, Alice chooses a random integer k and sends the pair 
of points (kP, M + k(rbP)). 
(iv) To read M, Bob computes 
M + k (rbP) -- rb(kP) = M. 
Anyone who can solve the discrete logarithm problem on E can, of course, determine rb from 
the publicly known information P and rbP. But  as everybody knows, there is no efficient way  "to 
compute  discrete logarithms on E, the system is thus secure. 
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5.1. Para l le l  Computat ions  of  kP 
Compared with the famous U.S. government's Data Encryption Standard (DES), both the 
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) system [12] and Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) system are 
slow, even using special hardware. The reason for this is that the RSA is based on exponentia- 
tion a k, whereas the ECC is based on group operation kP, both over some finite field. We say a k 
and kP can be efficiently computed only when they are compared to the exponential complexity 
computation. One way to speed-up the computation of a k and kP is via parallelization. The 
idea of a naive parallel algorithm to compute kP (respectively, a k) can be as follows. 
ALGORITHM 3. (Simple parallel algorithm for computing Q = kP.) 
begin parallel 
for i from i0 to O(logk) do 
compute 2iP 
end parallel 
compute Q ---- ~ 2iP 
(It is assumed that we have sequentially tried all the small values up to i0.) Clearly, with this 
naive algorithm, kP can be computed in O(log log k) group operations with O(log k) processors. 
For example, at most 28 processors will be needed to compute 232792560P and at most, five 
group operations will be needed for each of these processors. More efficient parallel algorithms 
are known; for example, Brickell and Gordon et al. [13] have developed a parallel algorithm 
for computing ak in O(loglog k) group operations and O(log k~ log log k) processors. It seems 
reasonable to conjecture the following. 
CONJECTURE 1. kP can also be computed in O(log log k) elliptic curve group operations with 
O(log k~ log log k) processors. 
This will need to be justified. 
5.2. Mass ive ly  Para l le l  Approach  to ECDLP 
As mentioned previously, given an elliptic curve E over Fp with p prime, and P a point on E, 
the discrete logarithm on E, denoted by ECDLP, is the problem: given a point Q E E, find an 
integer k E Z such that kP = Q if such a k exists. A simple but typical question of ECDLP is: 
what is the discrete logarithm of Q(-0.35, 2.39) to the base P( -1.65,  -2.79) in the elliptic curve 
group E : y2 __ x 3 _ 5x ~- 4 E R? Again, an easy way to compute k = logp Q is to have as many 
processors as possible, and to let one processor Yi to perform one computation xiP, 
y~ ~ ~ xiP, for i = 1,2, . . .  
and find an xi so that xiP = Q; this xi is then the required value for k. The parallel algorithm 
for doing this looks like the following algorithm. 
ALGORITHM 4. (Simple parallel algorithm for computing k = logp Q.) 
begin parallel 
for i from I to n do 
compute xiP 
end parallel 
if xiP = Q, then print k = xi 
(It is assumed the values for x~ are very large, since we can try all the small values of xi first; 
it is assumed that n is also very large.) Of course, this algorithm is not very practical, since 
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it is impossible to build up exponentially many processors. There are several nontrivial parallel 
approaches to the ordinary discrete logarithm problem. For example, Gordon and McCurley [14] 
have recently developed a massively parallel method to the computat ion of discrete logarithms 
over a finite field. They showed that  the computat ion of discrete logarithms in GF(2521) is 
possible, whereas in GF(2521) is out of reach on their machines 1024 nCUBE-2, 64 Intel iPSC/860, 
and 512 Intel Touchstone Delta. Little work has been done on parallel computat ion of elliptic 
curve discrete logarithms. The development of a massively parallel algorithm for computing 
elliptic curve discrete logarithms on a supercomputer is a problem yet to be addressed. Work 
has commenced on this problem, using a Cray T3D supercomputer at the Edinburgh Parallel 
Comput ing Centre (EPCC).  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a method for fast group operations on elliptic curves, and its implementation i
the computer algebra system Maple is discussed. Two interesting applications of the fast method 
have also been considered: one in factoring and the other in cryptography. Some future work on 
parallel elliptic curve computat ions are also outlined. 
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